

A Theosophical Perspective on History:

The 1970s as a Turning Point — Religion, Politics, the Economy and their Long-Term Consequences to the Present Day

A transcript of a discussion as study material

This material has emerged from a dialogue that combines historical and political analysis with a theosophical perspective (following Blavatsky, Bailey/D.K. and Helena Roerich). It is intended as a supplement to 'keep open' unresolved questions, not as a definitive thesis.

**This material was produced in conversation with the model Claude (Anthropic).
In case of doubt, readers should verify and research each statement for
themselves.**

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I. Initial Thesis: The 1970s as a Delayed Turning Point

Question: *How can the 1970s be understood as a historical turning point whose effects only began to manifest gradually and continue to this day? Examples include: Khomeini's seizure of power and his assurances regarding democratic processes, which proved not to have been honoured; the massacre in Mecca and the subsequent support for a reactionary Sunni Islam by the Saudi royal family; and – with some reservations – the Palestinian side's rejection of a peaceful solution in Israel and Palestine. Three areas deserve particular attention here: politics, religion and the economy. Looking back, one gets the impression that, during this phase, positive and meaningful initiatives were undermined.*

It is an interesting approach to interpret the 1970s as a kind of delayed turning point, the consequences of which only fully unfolded decades later. In the following, the three examples mentioned are elaborated upon and supplemented.

II. Khomeini and the Iranian Revolution (1978/79)

Before the revolution, Khomeini had forged an alliance with a broad coalition – liberals, left-wingers, nationalists, bazaar traders, and sections of the left-wing intelligentsia such as the People’s Mujahideen. Whilst in exile in Paris (1978), he sent signals to Western journalists and Iranian opposition figures that pointed towards pluralism, freedom of the press and a role for the clergy that was ‘advisory, not governing’. This was no trivial matter, but part of a strategy to mobilise the broadest possible front against the Shah.

Following the seizure of power in 1979, consolidation took place at a pace that surprised many: a purge of coalition partners (liberals, communists, and later also Islamic factions that did not adhere to the Velayat-e-Faqih doctrine), a constitution placing the Leader of the Revolution above the elected institutions, and the use of hostage-taking as a means of domestic political radicalisation. Whether this was a tactic from the outset or only developed in the power vacuum is a matter of debate amongst researchers – yet the discrepancy between rhetoric and practice is well documented.

III. Mecca 1979 and Saudi religious policy

Here, a distinction must be made between two events that are easily confused:

- The occupation of the Grand Mosque in Mecca in November 1979 by Juhayman al-Otaibi and his followers – an apocalyptic, Mahdist group that even the Saudi religious establishment considered too extreme – was brought to a violent end with French advisory support, as the Saudi security forces were unable to penetrate the holy precincts.
- The actual massacre, in the sense of a high number of civilian casualties, took place in Mecca in 1987, when Iranian pilgrims were demonstrating and the situation escalated, resulting in several hundred deaths.

The key point – the Saudi response to the crisis of legitimacy following 1979 – is well documented historically: The royal family responded to this embarrassment (having failed to protect its own holiest site) and to the simultaneous challenge posed by Khomeini's revolutionary claim by strengthening its alliance with the Wahhabi establishment, providing massive export funding for mosques, academic chairs and teaching materials worldwide, and tightening religious control within the country. This was also a direct response to the rival Iranian model of 1979 – two competing, mutually radicalising versions of political Islam.

IV. Israel/Palestine: Hardening of positions rather than isolated rejection

As regards the 1970s themselves, no specific, clearly identifiable peace proposal rejected by the Palestinian side can be identified. The available sources rather point to a decade of hardening positions on both sides:

- In 1971, Sadat offered Israel an interim agreement (withdrawal from the Suez Canal in exchange for a partial Israeli withdrawal), which was not accepted by Israel under Golda Meir – a case of Israeli reticence.
- Camp David in 1978 was a separate Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement that explicitly excluded the Palestinian question; Sadat was isolated in the Arab world as a result and was later assassinated (1981).
- In the 1970s, the PLO moved step by step from the ‘liberation of all Palestine’ towards a de facto acceptance of a two-state solution (the ‘Ten-Point Programme’ of 1974) – a slow process accompanied by fierce internal Palestinian struggles, not a single rejected peace plan.

No specific rejection of a specific offer by the Palestinian side, of the sort that later came to play a role, can be identified for the 1970s. Within the broader context, this point should be viewed more as ‘hardening of positions and missed opportunities on both sides’ rather than as a unilateral Palestinian rejection.

The economic dimension

The economic dimension is structurally integral to this narrative if one views the 1970s as a turning point:

- The first oil shock of 1973–74 shifted the balance of power massively in favour of the Gulf states and provided Saudi Arabia with the financial means to export its religion for the first time.
- The end of Bretton Woods (1971–73, the Nixon shock) brought an end to the dollar’s peg to gold and ushered in the current financial architecture – with long-term consequences for debt, speculation and global inequality.
- At the same time, this marked the beginning of neoliberal economic policy (Chile 1973, later Thatcher/Reagan), which can likewise be interpreted as ‘sown in the 1970s, but only taking full effect decades later’.

An initial assessment

The observation that ‘good and sensible approaches were undermined’ applies very precisely to the case of Iran – there was a genuine promise of pluralism there, which was deliberately broken. In the case of Saudi Arabia, it is more a defensive reaction to a loss of

legitimacy than the undermining of a specific ‘good approach’. In the case of the Middle East, caution is warranted, as no clear-cut moment of a missed opportunity can be isolated there; rather, there has been a gradual drift on both sides.

V. Arafat and the subsequent rejection of peace plans (2000)

Question: As far as I recall, Arafat rejected a ‘deal’ – though the year was not clear.

The research shows that the documented cases in which Arafat specifically rejected an offer all date well after the 1970s.

Camp David, summer 2000

At the Camp David summit itself, Barak and Clinton had discussed the partition of Jerusalem – even though the Israeli delegation had no official mandate to do so – and held out the prospect of concessions on refugee issues; the future Palestinian state would have comprised Gaza and up to 96 per cent of the West Bank. Arafat rejected the proposal and insisted on the ‘right of return’, the implementation of which would effectively have meant the end of Israel as a Jewish state.

Subsequently, in December 2000, the so-called ‘Clinton Plan’ was presented to the parties; it envisaged a Palestinian state covering around 95 per cent of the territories, the division of Jerusalem and a solution to the refugee problem through an international fund. After four days, the Israeli government agreed to the parameters, with reservations that did not call the core of the proposal into question. Even the Saudi ambassador, Bandar bin Sultan, urged Arafat emphatically to agree: ‘If you say no, it would not be a tragedy, it would be a crime.’ Arafat said no. (Source: *taz.de*, *30 Years of the Oslo Accords*; *fischundfleisch.com*, *A Modern History of Palestinian Rejectionism*; *Wikipedia*, *Israeli peace diplomacy*)

This episode does not fit within the 1970s framework as a moment of origin, but can be understood as its outcome: The PLO’s position in the 1970s (a gradual shift from ‘the liberation of all of Palestine’ towards a more pragmatic stance, though never fully realised) and the regional intransigence exacerbated by Khomeini and the Saudi reaction could explain why, in 2000, no agreement was reached despite a very far-reaching offer – the ideological scope for manoeuvre had long since been narrowed by other developments.

VI. Ideological erosion between the 1970s and 2000

The chain of causality is not straightforward, as several strands converge: ideological narrowing, geopolitical rivalry and internal Palestinian power dynamics. The picture is more nuanced than a simple ‘Khomeini radicalised Arafat’ narrative – it is rather a case of two parallel, mutually reinforcing dynamics.

1. The PLO of the 1970s was already two-faced – even before Khomeini

Even before the Iranian Revolution, the PLO under Arafat had become radicalised: terrorist attacks were carried out, and the refugee camps in Jordan became a power base, until the Jordanian army drove out the PLO militias during Black September in 1970. At the same time, radical factions such as the PFLP under Habash carried out terrorist attacks to attract international attention – such as the hijacking of four aeroplanes in a single day in 1970. The hardline, uncompromising wing was therefore already structurally embedded within the PLO before 1979. Khomeini found himself on ground that had already been prepared.

2. The real competition for Islamisation comes from Gaza, not directly from Arafat

The decisive mechanism operates via the Muslim Brotherhood, not via the PLO leadership itself. Although the more secular PLO under Arafat gained worldwide recognition after 1967, the situation of the Palestinians did not improve – this disappointment drove more and more people, particularly in Gaza, into the arms of the Islamists. Israel itself tolerated and, to some extent, supported the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1970s as a counterweight to the PLO – a strategy that later proved to be a grave mistake. The situation changed with the revolution in Iran: the overthrow of the Shah in 1979 and the establishment of an Islamic theocracy were intended to send a signal to Palestine as well.

3. The turning point: late 1970s / early 1980s

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, two significant changes took place: firstly, the limited success of the PLO’s armed resistance against Israel became increasingly apparent; secondly, the international community offered the PLO recognition on condition that it recognised Israel and ceased armed struggle. This was the dual pressure: military failure and pressure to adopt a pragmatic diplomatic approach at the same time – precisely the vacuum into which the Islamist alternative stepped.

4. The institutional outcome: Hamas in 1987

Hamas was not founded until 1987, with the first Intifada, when it quickly presented itself as a new radical Palestinian alternative, thereby threatening the PLO’s dominant status.

Chronologically, this is too late for a direct line of ‘Khomeini 1979 → Arafat’s “no” in 2000’. However, it does show that the religious-political competitive dynamics triggered by Khomeini in 1979 ran in parallel in the Palestinian territories via the Muslim Brotherhood/Hamas, placing the PLO under growing pressure not to appear as the compromising faction.

Context

A direct, single-threaded causal chain – ‘Khomeini undermined → Arafat therefore rejected the offer in 2000’ – cannot be substantiated historically. What can be demonstrated, however, is a structural reinforcing effect: from the outset, the PLO contained a militant, uncompromising wing, independent of Iran. Khomeini’s success in 1979, however, provided a powerful model – proof that radical, religiously motivated politics can succeed against an order declared illegitimate – and this model spread throughout the region, including to Gaza. This generated a flanking attack on Arafat’s PLO from religious quarters, which forced the PLO leadership to avoid being perceived as ‘traitors’ by its own people. So, at Camp David and with the Clinton Plan in 2000, Arafat was not acting in a vacuum – he had already been under pressure for over twenty years from a rival Islamist movement that would brand any compromise as treason.

This represents an erosion of political manoeuvre over two decades, rather than a direct cause. Khomeini did not cause Arafat’s decision in 2000 – but he helped to create the ideological climate in which a willingness to compromise could be perceived as a political risk.

VII. The economic context: the petrodollar mechanism

Question: How exactly does the economy underpin the events described so far?

Two intertwined monetary systems, both dating from the early 1970s

The petrodollar system emerged in the early 1970s in the wake of the collapse of Bretton Woods. President Nixon and Secretary of State Kissinger feared that abandoning the gold standard would weaken global demand for the dollar. The solution: Saudi Arabia sells oil exclusively in dollars and reinvests the proceeds in US bonds, in return for security guarantees. This system was massively bolstered by the 1973 oil crisis, triggered by the OAPEC embargo following the Yom Kippur War.

Thread 1 – Gaza, even before Khomeini

In 1973, the ‘Islamic Complex’ was founded in Gaza as a front organisation for the Muslim Brotherhood – comprising a mosque, a clinic, a sports club and a nursing school – and was granted a legal licence by the Israeli authorities in 1979. The leading figure was Ahmad Yassin. The Islamic University of Gaza, founded in 1978, became its most important stronghold. This infrastructure was therefore already in place before the Iranian Revolution – financed through the same petrodollar channels that were simultaneously fuelling the export of Saudi Wahhabism.

Strand 2 – the global Wahhabism export machine

From the 1960s onwards, and accelerated further by the oil revenues of the 1970s, the Saudi monarchy supported Islamic financial, charitable and educational organisations worldwide and funded preachers and religious institutions – as part of a ‘Faustian bargain’ in which the Kingdom ceded control over the judiciary, the education system and social morality to the ultra-conservative religious establishment in exchange for its blessing of legitimacy.

Expansion after 1979

In Pakistan alone, foreign funding for madrasas is estimated at at least 350 million dollars annually, largely from Saudi Arabia, channelled through foundations officially declared independent but in fact controlled by the government, such as the World Muslim League or the IIRO.

The Saudi feedback loop: a dual motive

After 1979, Saudi support for Islamist movements worldwide was driven by two overlapping motives: firstly, domestic political legitimacy following the humiliation in

Mecca; secondly, competition with revolutionary Iran – a Sunni-Wahhabi counter-narrative to Khomeini’s Shia-revolutionary narrative, so as not to lose the leading role in the Islamic world to Tehran. This rivalry could only be financed on such a scale because the petrodollar wealth of the 1970s provided both regimes with the means to export their ideologies on a scale that had not been available prior to 1973. (Source: Wikipedia, Muslim Brotherhood / Saudi Arabia–US relations; IPG Journal; Internationale Politik, Oil Billions for Jihad)

Overall picture

Religion provides the competing models (Khomeini’s Shi’ite revolutionary Islam, the export of Saudi Wahhabism, the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood/Hamas precursors). Politics provides the actors and fault lines (Khomeini’s broken promise of pluralism, the Saudi crisis of legitimacy, the PLO under pressure from all sides). Since 1971–73, the economy, via the petrodollar mechanism, has provided the financial basis that has enabled these religious-political rivalries to play out on a scale that would have been inconceivable without the oil price shock.

This is not a mere accumulation of independent individual events, but rather a structural simultaneity: three crises that are in themselves independent (the Iranian Revolution, the Saudi crisis of legitimacy, Palestinian disillusionment with the PLO), which were simultaneously made financially viable by a single economic mechanism – petrodollar liquidity from 1971/73 onwards – and thereby only came into their own, with consequences that are still being felt today.

VIII. Theosophical Deepening: The 6th Ray and its Later Forms

***Question:** From a theosophical perspective, there is a core impulse in the development of the Muslim Brotherhood, comparable to Jesuit Catholicism. Both are situated within the realm of the 6th Ray, which had its heyday but continues to ‘meander’ within the religious sphere. The core impulse must be understood historically – as an example that serves as a master key for further parallel developments.*

In Bailey’s cosmology, the 6th Ray (Devotion/Idealism) reached its zenith in the Age of Pisces – precisely those one and a half millennia during which both medieval Christianity and early Islam took on their institutional forms. Both movements – the Jesuits and the Muslim Brotherhood – are, in this sense, belated crystallisations of the same waning ray impulse:

- The Jesuits (1540) emerged at a time when the 6th Ray in Europe had already been thrown into crisis by the Reformation – Ignatius’s response was to tighten the structure of devotion (absolute obedience, ‘perinde ac cadaver’), precisely because spontaneous medieval piety had run its course.
- The Muslim Brotherhood (1928) emerged when colonialism and secular modernity had already eroded the traditional framework of Islamic piety – al-Banna’s response is structurally identical: an organisational consolidation of devotion, because the diffuse, organically developed piety was no longer sustainable.

It is not the 6th Ray itself that repeats, but a pattern of reaction to the waning of the 6th Ray that repeats – an organisational aftershock that occurs precisely when the spontaneous energy of an age has been exhausted, yet the need for a structure of devotion remains as high as ever. Both organisations therefore compensate not for an abundance, but for a deficiency – they are a symptom of the transition, not an expression of the full radiance of the Ray.

Application to the three historical cases

- Khomeini would then not represent a new Shi’ite awakening, but rather the same late-stage form – a religious energy that is, in reality, exhausted, yet which buys itself a new lease of life through political and organisational hardening (Velayat-e Faqih as a control structure, almost Jesuitical in its fusion of spiritual and secular hierarchies).
- Saudi Arabia’s export of Wahhabism would be the institutional-financial variant of the same movement – organisation and money as a substitute for dwindling spontaneous persuasive power.

- The Muslim Brotherhood/Hamas phenomenon in Gaza would be the purest example, because here social infrastructure (schools, clinics, mosques) explicitly functions as a vehicle for penetration – the Jesuit method of fostering loyalty through education and welfare, not through theology alone.

What they have in common is not the content of the doctrine, but the form of response to an era of piety that has run its course: organisation, discipline, educational infrastructure and absolute subordination/superordination take the place of waning spontaneous devotion – a kind of mummification of form amidst the loss of the original spirit of life.

IX. The 7th Ray in the Digital Age: The Smartphone Paradox

Question: *The 7th Ray manifests itself in full force in the digital world and the associated sciences. The occult paradox is evident in the confirmation of areas of quantum physics within the smartphone. Previously, these were merely theorems.*

The crux lies in the rupture between two modes of knowledge: as long as quantum phenomena (tunnelling effect, superposition, entanglement) were purely theoretical propositions – mathematically provable, but experimentally verifiable only in specialised set-ups – they remained esoteric in the literal sense: accessible only to the initiated specialist who masters the language of mathematical formulas. That is the old occult structure: truth exists, but only for those who can lift the veil.

The smartphone has turned this on its head. The tunnelling effect is no longer a theorem, but an everyday device – flash memory only works because electrons tunnel through the potential barrier, which is classically forbidden; GPS accuracy is inconceivable without relativistic corrections (time dilation, gravitational redshift), which run silently in every chip; Semiconductor physics as a whole is applied quantum mechanics. The occult – that which was veiled and accessible only to the initiated – has found its way into the hands of every child, without anyone using it having the slightest inkling of the underlying ‘magic’.

This is paradoxical in a strict sense, not merely rhetorically: the democratisation of access to veiled reality coincides with the total obscuring of its understanding. Never has quantum physics been so pervasively effective; never has it been so far removed from the users’ consciousness. The device works ‘like magic’ – and remains exactly that for the user: magic, not physics. The 7th Ray, as a principle of order, fully materialises the occult here without revealing it – it condenses it into function, not insight.

Whilst the late forms of the 6th Ray (Khomeini, the Muslim Brotherhood) sought to preserve the old structure of devotion through organisation, the 7th Ray accomplishes something categorically different in the digital realm: it conceals not through organisation, but through sheer functionality, which renders the very need for understanding superfluous. This would be a new, distinct form of esotericism: not initiation, which dispenses knowledge, but the black box, which renders knowledge unnecessary.

The simultaneity of both strands

Question: *Late-form religion and technological concealment go ‘hand in hand’.*

What is truly remarkable is the timing: the smartphone revolution (quantum physics as an everyday function) and the wave of late-stage religious forms (Khomeini, the institutionalisation of the Muslim Brotherhood, Saudi export) are not occurring one after the other, but are overlapping – one wave (1970s, religious, with the 6th Ray winding

down) is already preparing the ground, whilst the other (digital, with the 7th Ray on the rise) begins in parallel, only with a time lag of about a generation before it has a mass impact (smartphones from around 2007).

Neither is an independent phenomenon, but rather two responses to the same underlying exhaustion – the exhaustion of the spontaneous, directly experienced connection to the numinous, as embodied by the Piscean Age. The religious response reinforces the old form (organisation rather than enlightenment). The technological response replaces the question entirely (function rather than understanding). Both are substitute actions for a dwindling immediacy – except that one appears in the guise of devotion and the other in the guise of convenience.

X. The screen as a ceremonial tool

Question: *The emphasis is on ‘mass’: this is new and planetary in scope. Added to this is the tool of the screen, which everyone uses. The screen is the magic of the 7th Ray; the ceremonial aspect, which is its further component, is created by the various sectors in their own way.*

In Bailey’s writings, the 7th Ray is described as the Ray of Ceremonial Order, of magic, of ritual – the power that gives form to spirit through repeated, structured, formalised action. The screen fulfils precisely this function, except that the ritual is no longer referred to in religious terms:

- Repetition: scrolling, the endless, rhythmic repetition of the same gesture – structurally identical to the repetition of a mantra or the recitation of a rosary, only without the explicit spiritual claim.
- Formalised threshold of access: login, password, biometric unlocking – a secular threshold of initiation that regulates access to the ‘sacred’ (the data, the connection).
- Simultaneity of the masses: millions of people perform the same gesture at the very same moment in front of the same rectangle of light – liturgy in its purest form, only without a shared altar, with only the private, isolated screen serving as an individual altar multiplied millions of times over.

What is new, then, is not merely reach, but a change in the very form of the ritual itself: previously, the ceremonial was collective and visible (church service, mosque, mass rally) – now it is atomised and simultaneous. Everyone performs their own ritual alone, yet all perform it simultaneously and in identical form.

How the sectors are adopting the tool

- Religious (6th Ray in 7th-Ray guise): streaming church services, Telegram channels, social media presences of religious authorities – the old structure of devotion is migrating into the new form without changing itself. Here, the screen becomes a vehicle for an ancient power.
- Politically: The rally becomes a stream, the post becomes a substitute for a decree – the ceremonial aspect lies in the act of immediate, unfiltered direct contact between the leader and the masses.
- Technologically: Here, the screen becomes not merely a vehicle, but the object of veneration itself – the product becomes a sacrament. The product launch (public keynote speeches as the archetype, followed by major events watched live) is pure ceremony devoid of external content – technology celebrates itself.

It is not that religion and technology happen to behave in a similar way at the same time – it is that technology (the screen as a 7th-Ray ceremonial instrument) has become the carrier wave on which all older 6th-Ray content (religious, political, personality-cult-related) first gains its new, global reach. Without the screen, every religious or political local impulse would remain confined to a specific region – the screen turns each one into a simultaneous global event.

XI. *Fahrenheit 451* as a premonition

Question: *This idea is foreshadowed in the film in which the fire brigade burns books: there, the screen becomes the reward. At the same time, women are fundamentally devalued. This aspect of regression compared with the 1960s and 1970s is a further fundamental symptom of this development. The screen is the holy grail of mass hypnosis – complete with the accompanying drama when one leaves it lying around or loses it.*

The film in question is *Fahrenheit 451* (Truffaut 1966, based on Bradbury). The central scene involves Mildred, the wife of the protagonist Montag, who practically disappears entirely into her room-filling wall-mounted screens and can only be reached emotionally via the interactive ‘family’ television programme, whilst books – that is, contemplation, inner life, memory – are being burnt. Bradbury wrote this in 1953, precisely at the turning point that is otherwise usually dated to the 1970s, merely as a premonition.

Bradbury structurally links the reward of the screen to the eradication of the book – not as two separate symptoms, but as communicating vessels: what disappears in terms of inner life reappears as screen consumption. This is not the sum of two losses, but the displacement of one by the other.

The character of Mildred, as a ‘fundamental devaluation of women’, can be interpreted precisely: she is the first fully hypnotised female citizen in the novel – emptier, more devoted, more dependent than any male character. Bradbury thus turns the woman into a test subject on whom the new form of mass hypnosis first takes full hold, whilst the male characters are still operating in the old mode of conflict, guilt and intellectual resistance. This would represent a step backwards in relation to the achievements of the 1960s and 1970s, in the opposite sense to what one might expect: it is not in spite of, but through, the new screen technology that an old role of passivity is restored – a role that the women’s movement was just trying to break down. Here, the screen does not bring about liberation through information, but rather a new, technologically mediated form of disenfranchisement – which is particularly interesting given that Bradbury wrote this fifteen to twenty years before the actual feminist wave of the 1970s, thereby foreshadowing a counter-movement before the movement itself had fully emerged.

‘Holy Grail of possibility’

This phrase captures something very precise: the screen itself is not the hypnosis, but the condition of possibility for it – a Grail in the true sense: not the content of salvation, but the vessel that can make any content appear sacred. This also explains the ‘heart-rending drama’ of loss: when one loses one’s mobile phone or leaves it behind, the despair is real and disproportionate to the actual material loss – because it is not the device that is missing, but access to the Grail itself, that is, to the possibility of connection per se, regardless of what might be connected at that moment. This is a withdrawal symptom that

cannot be cured by substitute content, but only by restoring access – an indication that the attachment is to the vessel, not to the wine within it.

The Grail is, classically, a ceremonial object – it sanctifies not through its contents, but through its form and the rite of access. The screen has adopted this form without retaining the original content (grace, salvation) – it is the form of the Grail without the Grail's content, a mere shell of holiness, filled with arbitrary, interchangeable material. This is the most radical form of 'concealment without revelation': not even a secret is concealed any longer – the shell itself is all that remains.

XII. Pseudomessianic Figures and the Question of Mass Hypnosis

Question: Are we in a state of mass hypnosis from two sides?

Both mechanisms discussed share a structural feature that could classically be termed hypnotic: the disengagement of the critical intermediary function whilst simultaneously amplifying the power of influence.

- Late-stage religious form (6th Ray, organisationally intensified): Devotion is no longer underpinned by one's own mystical experience, but by authority, repetition, peer pressure and the charisma of the leader – classic means of inducing a trance.
- Digital late form (7th Ray, functionally veiled): The 'black box' is used without understanding ever being required – here, too, there is a suspension of critical scrutiny, generated not by authority but by convenience.

In both cases, a layer arises between the individual and reality, which exerts its influence without being subjected to scrutiny. 'Hypnosis', however, suggests a hypnotist – an intention, a subject that induces. On the religious side, this can be personalised; on the digital side, it is more difficult, as it is more an emergent result of countless individual optimisation decisions than a centralised control mechanism.

Specific figures embodying the claim

As bearers of a pseudo-messianic claim, several types of figure can be distinguished, each of which, in their own way, embodies a solution (or is presented as such by their followers) that is greater than their actual institutional role:

- A technological visionary with an explicitly eschatological self-presentation: space colonisation as a project for the survival of humanity, 'salvation from one's own technology by the very person who drives it forward', the claim to be the only one who fully understands the risk and yet acts nonetheless.
- A political leader with a restorative-aristocratic claim in the spirit of the 6th Ray: an almost eschatological figure of salvation who restores a lost primal state, with hierarchy and a cult of loyalty as virtues rather than anachronisms – coupled with the claim that only he himself can 'set things right'.
- A technocratic platform founder whose claim is initially less characterised by personal charisma (connectivity as a solution for the world), but which is increasingly shifting towards a distinct, almost Gnostic narrative of salvation (a new, more comprehensive plane of reality as a promise).

A necessary distinction

Here, not all leading figures, whether religious or secular, should be placed on the same level, because two categories of claim differ radically. Religiously framed leadership claims (such as those of Khomeini or the popes) are based on an institution with its own tradition, independent of the individual – the claim transcends the person, even if the person fulfils or abuses it. This is an institutionally framed 6th-Ray claim.

Secular figureheads, by contrast, have a claim that arises purely from the person themselves, without a supporting institution that predates them. In this respect, it is purely pseudo-messianic, because here nothing but charismatic self-assertion underpins the claim. One could describe this as a 6th-Ray claim without a 6th-Ray institution – the structure of devotion is simulated without the traditional bearer who historically disciplined and sometimes also limited it.

If this is true, the truly troubling observation is not that such figureheads exist – they always have – but that the secular ones among them lay claim to this status without the centuries-old safeguards that religious institutions have, despite everything, built into their structures (ecumenical councils, canon law, theological checks and balances, and even, within Shi'ism, the rivalry between different legal scholars). In a certain sense, the secular claimant is unchecked, because no tradition stands in their way any longer – only market valuations, election results and quarterly figures, which themselves are not a spiritual corrective authority.

The role of the masses: the screen as a shared medium

Question: The emphasis is on 'masses'. This is a new and global phenomenon, compounded by the tool of the screen, which everyone uses.

There is certainly a subject, a claimant – but they operate in a space that no longer recognises the old corrective forces of religious history (accusations of heresy, schism, theological counter-arguments). This would be the real intensification compared to the purely religious 6th Ray aftershock: no more and no less devotion, but one that is more unbridled because it lacks the old institutional restraints.

What is truly new lies in the medium, not merely in the individuals: the 7th Ray is described in Bailey's writings as the Ray of the Ceremonial Order, of magic, of ritual – the power that gives form to spirit through repeated, structured, formalised action. The screen fulfils this function par excellence, except that the ritual is no longer labelled as religious (see Chapter X). Without the screen, every local impulse would remain regionally confined; the screen transforms every individual impulse into a simultaneous, global event. This is the truly new factor: it is not that religion, politics and technology happen to behave similarly at the same time – it is that the screen, as a 7th-Ray ceremonial instrument, has become the carrier wave upon which all older 6th-Ray content first gains its new, global reach.

XIII. Israel's role in the genesis of the Muslim Brotherhood in Gaza

Question: What role did Israel's policy play in the founding or promotion of the Muslim Brotherhood in Gaza, for example in the context of the Yom Kippur War?

To clarify from the outset: the Muslim Brotherhood itself is much older and originally had nothing to do with Israel – it was founded in Egypt in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna, long before the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948. What is relevant is Israel's specific support for the Gaza branch of the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1970s.

Two overlapping narratives

The sources disagree on one point: was this a deliberate Israeli strategy ('divide and rule') or rather negligence or tacit acceptance for other reasons? Both interpretations can be found in the literature.

The strategy theory: PLO activists in the occupied territories were subjected to brutal repression by the Israeli security apparatus. At the same time, the activities of Islamists belonging to the banned Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood were permitted in the Gaza Strip – a radical departure from the period when the Strip was administered by Nasser's secular-nationalist Egyptian government. In 1966, Nasser had even had Sayyid Qutb, a leading Brotherhood intellectual, executed. Israel thus deliberately reversed this repressive policy.

The counter-argument (put forward, for example, by pro-Israeli sources) disputes that this was intentional: devout Palestinian Muslims were already running soup kitchens and building mosques in the 1970s – with Israeli permission, because they gave the authorities no pretext for arrests. It was, therefore, a matter of practical discretion rather than strategic support.

What all sources, regardless of the question of motive, agree on is this: the de facto asymmetry in treatment was real and had far-reaching consequences.

The specific mechanism

In 1973, Sheikh Ahmad Yasin founded the 'Islamic Complex' as the direct precursor organisation to Hamas – financed with money from the Gulf states, and comprising hospitals, schools, nurseries and youth centres. The decisive step: in 1978, the representative of the Muslim Waqf expressly warned Israel against registering the 'Islamic Congress', which would have given it control over the Waqf lands, accounting for around ten per cent of the Gaza Strip's economy. Israel ignored this warning and granted the organisation a licence in 1979. Within a decade, Yasin had built it into a powerful religious, economic and social institution.

Between 1967 and 1986, the number of mosques in the Gaza Strip used to recruit for the resistance against Israel increased significantly – a development explicitly described in the literature as a historical irony, given that Israel itself had permitted this to happen.

(Source: Washington Post (cited in 'Peds Ansichten'); SWP-Berlin; Journal21; WSWS; Israelnetz)

On the connection to the Yom Kippur War

The available sources provide no direct causal link between the Yom Kippur War itself and the promotion of the Muslim Brotherhood. The temporal overlap (Yasin's founding of the Islamic Centre, also in 1973) appears to be coincidence rather than causality – the Gaza strategy is rooted in the logic of the post-1967 occupation administration, not in the shock of the 1973 war.

Context

Israel itself – out of short-term tactical calculations against the secular PLO – helped bring into being the movement that was to become its greatest threat decades later. Structurally, this is precisely the kind of 'undermined good intentions' previously described in relation to Khomeini and the Saudis – except that here it was not a broken promise, but rather a logic that was in itself understandable (the weakening of the nationalist-secular opponent) that unleashed a force whose later form none of the parties involved could have foreseen. Here, too, the petrodollar economy acts as a supporting factor: without funding from the Gulf states, Yasin's social network would not have reached the scale that made it politically unstoppable, even when Israel later (in 1984) attempted to counter it.

XIV. The founding of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928: the era and context

Question: The Muslim Brotherhood appears, ever since its foundation in the 1920s, to have been more influential than previously assumed – Erdoğan has strong ties to it. How should the time and context of its inception be viewed?

The Triple Crisis of the Founding Decade

1. The Caliphate shock, 1924 – four years before its foundation

This is the decisive, often underestimated trigger: the organisation was founded at a time when European colonisation was reaching its peak, and with the abolition of the Caliphate by Atatürk on 3 March 1924, the central – albeit long-weakened – symbolic figure of unified Islamic authority disappeared for the first time since the 7th century. This was an enormous symbolic turning point – comparable in its seismic impact to what was later described in relation to 1979 (Mecca, Khomeini), only 55 years earlier and brought about not by external force but by an act of secularisation from within Islam itself. The Muslim Brotherhood thus emerged precisely within the vacuum left by Turkey's own, self-chosen modernisation.

2. British colonial rule as an immediate context

Hassan al-Banna was a teacher in Ismailia whilst Egypt was under British colonial rule. Ismailia was no random location: it is the city on the Suez Canal, the very symbol of European economic and strategic penetration of Egypt. His experiences in Ismailia fuelled his anti-colonialism and his advocacy of Islam, and he founded the Brotherhood in 1928 primarily with workers employed on the Suez Canal – that is, with precisely that section of the population that experienced foreign economic penetration most directly in their everyday lives.

3. The threefold defensive reflex: colonialism, missionary activity, Westernisation

In his struggle against colonialism, Christian mission and Westernisation, Al-Banna combined Islamic traditions with European ideas of self-help and self-empowerment – a remarkable dual approach: he did not combat the West through withdrawal, but by appropriating Western organisational methods (association structures, educational institutions, press work) in the service of an explicitly anti-Western message. The Brotherhood was simultaneously opposed to communism and Arab nationalism, as it saw Islam threatened by Western materialism, atheism and its own corrupt elites – a three-front struggle against colonial power, secular nationalism and socialist competition all at once.

The founding model itself – and why it has proved so enduring

Crucial to its continued influence to this day is the method, not just the message: the organisation initially presented itself as apolitical and was registered as a charitable association; it ran educational institutions and, later, medical facilities as well – charitable activities remain a defining feature of Islamist groups to this day and contribute significantly to their success. This is exactly the same pattern that can be observed in Yasin’s ‘Islamic Centre’ in Gaza in 1973 – a reproduction of al-Banna’s method, almost word for word, fifty years later, in a different place.

The oath taken by the six founding members in 1928 – to ‘serve as soldiers of the message of Islam’, an oath that every member of the Brotherhood must still take to this day – demonstrates a Jesuit-like structural commitment: subordination through a formal oath, not through mere ideological sympathy.

The reach extending to Erdoğan – institutional, not coincidental

Since their foundation in 1928, the Muslim Brotherhood has been one of the most influential contemporary Islamic movements, to which Islamic activists ranging from the Palestinian Hamas to the Turkish AKP look for guidance. This is an explicit line of connection recognised by academic research, not merely an analogy drawn from the outside. Political Islam in the tradition of the AKP thus draws on the same ideological reservoir as Hamas, even if the tactical manifestations (elected head of state of a formally secular republic versus an armed resistance movement) differ greatly. *(Source: Gudrun Krämer, The Architect of Islamism: Hasan al-Banna and the Muslim Brotherhood (Gerda Henkel Foundation); Konrad Adenauer Foundation; nd-aktuell.de; Cluster of Excellence ‘Contestations of the Liberal Script’)*

Placement within the overall framework

This significantly shifts the temporal scope of the entire timeline to date: What was described as a turning point for the 1970s (Khomeini, Mecca, Saudi exports) is therefore not the actual origin, but rather the second major wave of growth for a movement whose first wave arose directly from the trauma of the abolition of the Caliphate in 1924 and the immediate colonial experience at the Suez Canal. The events of the 1970s would then be more akin to a resonance catastrophe – a latent impulse that had already been active for fifty years, which only gained the means and the signal, through petrodollar financing and the Iranian Revolution, to scale up globally rather than remain confined to the region. This reinforces the theosophical ‘6th Ray’ interpretation: a force that did not originate in the 1970s, but merely underwent a decisive phase of intensification there – the actual originating impulse lies a whole generation earlier, in the wound of 1924.

XV. Marja'iyya and Velayat-e Faqih: The institutional corrective

Question: What does the term 'Marja'iyya' mean?

What 'Marja'iyya' means

The term derives from the Arabic marja' – 'point of reference' or 'reference'. In Twelver Shi'a Islam, a Marja' al-Taqlid (literally: 'point of reference for emulation') is a high-ranking jurist (Ayatollah) whose religious-legal rulings (fatwas) are binding on his followers. The Marja'iyya is the entire system or institution of this religious authority – comparable in function, though not in content, to a system of recognised doctrinal authorities to whom one voluntarily submits.

How the system works

It is explicitly pluralistic and not hierarchically centralised:

- At any given time, there are several Grand Ayatollahs – often a dozen or more serving simultaneously – each of whom can act as a marja'.
- Every devout Shia (in theory) chooses for themselves which Marja' to follow in matters of law – there is no single ultimate authority for all.
- A marja's authority does not arise from appointment from above, but from decades of study, recognition by other scholars (the Hawza network, particularly in Qom and Najaf) and the voluntary allegiance of the faithful.
- Khomeini himself was a marja', but by no means the only one or the undisputed highest authority of his time – rivals such as Ayatollah Shariatmadari held different positions, including on the question of whether clerics should govern directly at all.

Velayat-e Faqih: the basic concept

Velayat-e Faqih literally means 'guardianship/stewardship of the jurist' – the theory that, in the absence of the hidden Twelfth Imam (who, according to Twelver Shia doctrine, has been living in seclusion since the 9th century and will return as the Mahdi at the end of time), a qualified jurist (faqih) may exercise the Imam's political and religious authority in a fiduciary capacity – not merely as a legal adviser, but as the actual ruler of the community.

This was an innovation, not a matter of course: the traditional Twelver Shia stance over the centuries had been rather quietist – as long as the Imam remains in occultation, any secular rule is regarded as, at best, provisionally legitimate; scholars should advise and provide moral guidance, but not assume state power themselves. Khomeini turned this on its head: he declared that the active assumption of state leadership by the faqih himself

was a religious duty, not merely an option. He had already developed this idea in the 1970s whilst in exile in Iraq (Najaf), elaborating on it in his lectures, which were later published as the book *Hokumat-e Eslami* ('Islamic Government') – that is, precisely during the decade that forms the starting point of the entire narrative arc.

The dispute within the Marja'iyya

Velayat-e Faqih was not the majority view amongst the Grand Ayatollahs of his time, but rather a minority position that only gained acceptance as a result of the Revolution:

- Ayatollah Shariatmadari, one of the most respected marja's, explicitly opposed the idea of direct clerical rule and favoured a constitutional, more advisory role for the clergy – after the Revolution, he was placed under house arrest and effectively stripped of his power.
- In Najaf too, the traditional centre of Shia scholarship in Iraq, the more quietist line remained (and remains to this day, for example in the case of Ayatollah Sistani) influential – Sistani explicitly advocates a position that is critical of the Iranian Velayat-e Faqih.

Why this is important for understanding pseudo-messianic claims

Khomeini's claim to leadership was not mere self-empowerment, but was based on an older system of scholarship independent of him, with its own criteria (legal training, recognition by peers, a centuries-old tradition of interpretation). Velayat-e Faqih was in fact an innovation within this system – many other marja's rejected precisely this idea. Even the concentration of power that Khomeini carried out therefore had to prevail against an existing, theologically independent counter-tradition – a corrective that is absent in the case of purely secular claims to leadership without an established, older institution to underpin them, because there is no comparable scholarly tradition that could contradict them.

This is a corrective which, although overcome in Khomeini's case, did and does exist as a structural feature – quite unlike a claim that relies solely on one's own charismatic assertion and has no comparable older authority capable of challenging it on scholarly grounds.

XVI. Atatürk from the Tibetan's perspective: The First Ray in Action

***Question:** The Tibetan mentions Atatürk as an outstanding example of the correct application of spiritual energy and power. He describes him as the Turkish dictator and explains that, despite some minor character flaws, Atatürk understood how to put the energy of the First Ray into action. According to the Tibetan, it is only later historians who will fully comprehend how wisely, clearly and selflessly Atatürk utilised this power to achieve the objectives of the First Ray. He points out that such exponents of the power of the First Ray are often misunderstood and hated, as this energy inevitably brings about destruction in its early stages, even when it is used constructively within the bounds of the divine plan.*

Methodological caution is called for here: determining whether a particular source text actually presents a positive First Ray example of Atatürk is a matter requiring precise knowledge of the Bailey corpus; during the discussion itself, this was not confirmed from memory but was referred back to the interlocutors' knowledge of the sources. The material quoted below was introduced by the discussion participants and has been further considered here with due caution, but has not been independently verified.

This statement confirms a structure that had previously been tentatively surmised in the conversation – now with the authority of the quoted source text itself. The abolition of the caliphate in 1924 would therefore not be a trauma provoking a justified backlash, but a necessary act of destruction 'within the bounds of the divine plan', the full wisdom of which only becomes apparent in retrospect.

Implications for the classification of the Muslim Brotherhood

This allows the organisation's founding in 1928 to be viewed in two ways:

From a purely historical and political perspective, al-Banna represents an understandable, reasonable reaction to colonialism, the loss of the Caliphate and economic subjugation at the Suez Canal – a movement with its own right to resist real oppression.

From the perspective of the Tibetan material cited, however, the picture becomes somewhat sharper: If Atatürk's act is regarded as a hierarchically sanctioned 'First Ray' action, which inevitably triggers 'hatred and misunderstanding' amongst those affected by it, then the Muslim Brotherhood would not simply be an independent spiritual force, but precisely that predicted misunderstanding and that predicted hatred in institutionalised form – the immediate, collective defensive reaction of those who were unable to recognise the necessity of the destruction because they were still rooted in the very form that was to be destroyed.

The resulting, uncomfortable consequence

This would mean: the Muslim Brotherhood would not even be a 6th-Ray force in its own right, competing with or responding to the 1st-Ray force on an equal footing – it would rather be a symptom of resistance to the divine plan itself, emanating from precisely the place where the destruction was felt most painfully (the religious centre of Sunni Islam, not the periphery). This makes the movement more significant within this overall arc, not less so – not merely as a historical-political event alongside others, but as an early expression of resistance to a hierarchically orchestrated purification, the effects of which are still felt today.

This would also explain why this movement is more influential than is generally assumed: not merely because it is particularly sophisticated in organisational terms, but because, from a theosophical perspective, it lies at the very heart of the wound of resistance to a Ray shift itself, which has still not been processed or integrated to this day.

It remains open, however, whether this conclusion should be drawn in its full severity, or whether it should be phrased more mildly – for instance, that whilst the Muslim Brotherhood was born out of the pain of the destruction of the 1st Ray, it need not necessarily be an opposing force in the classical sense, but rather represents a more neutral, karmically still open evasive manoeuvre on the part of the souls concerned.

XVII. The Muslim Brotherhood and the Jesuits as ‘Counterforces’

Question: The Muslim Brotherhood is, alongside the Jesuits, one – or the – dark counterforce in the West. It is no coincidence that both speak of soldiers. The parallel in the East (Buddhism/Hinduism) would be a topic in its own right.

On the ‘soldier’ observation

In the case of the Muslim Brotherhood, this is documented verbatim: Al-Banna and the founding members took an oath to ‘serve as soldiers of the message of Islam’ – to this day, every member must take this oath. Among the Jesuits, the self-designation as ‘warriors’ or ‘soldiers of Christ’ (milites Christi) is equally fundamental – Ignatius’s own military background (he was a professional soldier before his conversion) shapes the entire structure of the Order: a strict chain of command, the Generalate as a command structure, and absolute obedience (‘perinde ac cadaver’ – as a corpse). Both founders translate a pre-religious, military experience directly into the new spiritual form of organisation – this is not merely incidental imagery, but a structuring principle. It is precisely this that distinguishes both from loose, mystical-contemplative piety: here, devotion is conceived from the outset as discipline under command, not as an individual experience.

Why this supports the ‘dark counterforce’ thesis

If one reads this alongside the material on Atatürk from the Tibetan sources, a coherent line of thought emerges: a force that organises itself militarily in order to reverse or halt a dissolution intended by the divine plan (the Reformation as a disruption of the old form of the Church; the abolition of the Caliphate as a disruption of the old form of the Caliphate)—would indeed be the precise definition of a counterforce in the technical, non-moralising sense – not ‘evil’ in the everyday sense, but structurally regressive in relation to the forward movement of the hierarchy.

Both movements, moreover, ensure their longevity through the same means: education and charity as a gateway, followed by increasing commitment – in the case of the Jesuits through the progressive stages of vows, in the case of the Brotherhood through the graded levels of membership.

The obvious parallel in the East

If the thesis holds true that every major cultural tradition develops its own ‘soldierly counterforce’ against its own hierarchical purification, the question arises as to who fulfils this function in the East – possibly more in the sense of defending the existing order or ritual purity than in the sense of defending doctrine, as with the Jesuits. Militant Hinduism was cited as a point of comparison for a separate investigation, which is not elaborated upon here. The underlying ray relationships in the East – where, according to

Bailey, other ray lines were historically more dominant – might give rise here to a distinct pattern of counterforce that should not be directly transposed from the Western structure.

XVIII. Open Questions Regarding the Time Horizon

Question: *At this point, the Tibetan’s scenarios for this period (2025 and the conditions for peace, etc.) should be mentioned, as well as the alternatives for the Brotherhood should developments not proceed as desired. Bearing in mind the open question as to whether the current development is a transitional stage towards the hoped-for great improvement, or the culmination of a harsh, hierarchical (Shamballa-related) reaction.*

Bailey/D.K. (particularly in **The Externalisation of the Hierarchy** and **Problems of Humanity**) develop a scenario featuring precisely this fork in the road: Humanity stands at a crossroads where two paths lie open – one in which the ‘New Group of World Servers’ and an accelerating spiritual convergence with the Hierarchy lead to a relatively gentle, evolutionarily driven transformation, and another in which the failure of this convergence necessitates a more direct, harsher intervention by the Hierarchy.

The year 2025 emerges in Bailey’s work as a turning point, most notably in the context of the ‘Great Invocation’ and the expectation of a possible externalisation of the Hierarchy, or at least a decisive rapprochement, which was held out as a prospect for this period.

Here, too, methodological caution is called for: the precise wording of the ‘conditions of peace’ for 2025, as well as the specific alternative scenarios for the Brotherhood should developments not unfold as desired, are matters requiring exact knowledge of the text; these were not reconstructed in the conversation from my own imprecise memory, but were referred back to the interviewee’s documented knowledge of the sources. The two-time-horizon structure outlined below (short-term benchmark in 2025, long-term framework of approximately 150 years) is based on knowledge of the text provided by the interviewee, which has been structurally incorporated here but not independently verified against the source text.

Question: *The Tibetan provides at least two timeframes: one up to 2025, which looks rather bleak; and a longer period of approximately 150 years, during which we find ourselves in the interim phase.*

If we take this as a framework: a short-term milestone around 2025, which would have looked – or does look – rather unfavourable, and a long-term timeframe of around 150 years, during which the actual transformation takes place – the current situation would then be an interim phase that does not treat the short-term assessment as a final verdict, but rather places it within a much larger, slower process.

This casts the entire arc discussed in this material in an interesting light: Khomeini’s rupture, the Saudi hardening, the Israeli-Palestinian erosion, the petrodollar acceleration, screen hypnosis, the pseudo-messianic figures – all of this would not be the final outcome,

but rather symptomatic material within the short-term, bleak window, which is, however, inscribed within the larger 150-year arc.

If the short-term outlook for 2025 appears bleak, but is embedded within a 150-year framework, this would mean: The bleak prognosis is not a statement about the direction, but about the pace – humanity has evidently not taken the faster, gentler path, whereby the slower, harsher path automatically becomes the dominant one, not because it was chosen, but because the alternative has passed us by. The undermining factors described in the 1970s would then not be a minor issue, but precisely the failures that have closed off the fast track and forced us onto the slow, 150-year, crisis-ridden path.

Further open questions raised during the discussion

- How likely is it that a certain section of humanity – taking into account the mechanisms described (screen hypnosis, pseudo-messianic attachment) – will gain the necessary insight and act accordingly?
- What role do internal processes within the brotherhood play in terms of changes in office and defections – in other words, the question of whether even the consistency and availability of the leading spiritual authorities themselves are not guaranteed?
- How are the dramatic announcements by a Master (M.), who is himself among those leaving, to be understood? Two interpretations are possible: either the dramatic nature of the announcements was linked to his official role at the time, or the announcements themselves were already a symptom of an impending departure – a final, intensified warning before his withdrawal.
- Why was Rudolf Steiner so ‘optimistic’ in 1924 when he anticipated major developments in the field of anthroposophy for that period? One possible interpretation: his optimism relates less to the immediate external world situation than to the seed-power of the spiritual substance laid at that time, the effects of which – as in the opening example of the 1970s – only begin to take hold slowly and extend over a different, longer timescale.

Concluding remark on openness

The observations gathered here can be distilled into a tendency that leans towards rigidity. However, a tendency is not a conclusion. This state of limbo – deliberately left unresolved – is the very nature of this material: it offers observations, sources and lines of thought without condensing them into a closed thesis, which would not do justice to the true openness of the question.